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Abstract
Two forces have reshaped global securities markets in the last decade: Exchanges
operate at much faster speeds and the trading landscape has become more fragmented.
In order to analyze the positive and normative implications of these evolutions, we
study a framework that captures (i) exchanges’ incentives to invest in faster trading
technologies and (ii) investors’ trading and participation decisions. Our model pre-
dicts that regulations that protect prices will lead to fragmentation and faster trading
speed. Asset prices decrease when there is intermediation competition and are further
depressed by price protection. Endogenizing speed can also change the slope of asset
demand curves. On normative side, we find that for a given number of exchanges, faster
trading is in general socially desirable. Similarly, for a given trading speed, competition
among exchange increases participation and welfare. However, when speed is endoge-
nous, competition between exchanges is not necessarily desirable. In particular, speed
can be ineﬃciently high. Our model sheds light on important features of the experience
of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of MiFID and Reg. NMS, and
provides some guidance for optimal regulations.
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“In this high-tech stock market, Direct Edge and the other exchanges are sprint-
ing for advantage. All the exchanges have pushed down their latencies [...] Al-
most each week, it seems, one exchange or another claims a new record [...]
The exchanges have gone warp speed because traders have demanded it. Even
mainstream banks and old-fashioned mutual funds have embraced the change”.
The New York Times, January 1st 2011, The New Speed of Money, Reshaping
Markets
The securities exchange industry has been been deeply transformed over the past decade.
In particular, the speed at which investors trade has increased a lot, and stock trading,
particularly in the U.S., have become significantly more fragmented. The consequences of
these transformations are the subject of heated debates in academic and policy circles. In
this paper we provide a framework for the joint analysis of trading speed, trading regulations,
and market fragmentation.
Let us consider trading speed first. Major market centers around the world have made
costly investments in fast computerized trading platforms to reduce communication latencies.
This process has gone beyond stock exchanges to include derivatives and currencies, and it
has accelerated during the second half of the 2000s. Figure 1 illustrate this trend. It displays
the reduction in execution times of small orders on NYSE and NASDAQ. What is driving
this race for speed? In the human-driven trading era, higher execution speeds helped reduce
moral hazard with floor brokers, but this is less relevant in the current environment. In
this paper, we emphasize investor heterogeneity and vertical diﬀerentiation. We argue that
market centers seeking to attract order flows have an incentive to relax price competition by
diﬀerentiating along the speed dimension.
The second major feature of the new trading landscape is fragmentation, illustrated by
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Figure 1: Speed of Executing small orders (seconds)
Source: Angel, Harris and Spatt (2010)
Figure 2 for Europe and the U.S. The top panel (Europe) shows that traditional markets
such as the London Stock Exchange have lost market share to faster entrants such as Chi-X.
The bottom panel (US) shows an even more dramatic evolution: the fraction of NYSE-listed
stocks traded at the NYSE has decreased from 80% in 2004 to just over 20% in 2009. Most
of the lost trading volume has been captured by new entrants (e.g. Direct Edge and BATS).
Market regulators were not passive witnesses of this process. In the U.S., policy makers
have encouraged fragmentation to reduce the market power of exchanges and other interme-
diaries (prominently with Reg. NMS, which we discuss below).1 The eﬀects are tangible:
big cap stocks that previously traded in one or two exchanges can now be traded in near fifty
venues (including internalization pools and dark venues). But, does fragmentation achieve
the desired goal? Should it be fostered in the first place? We argue that the answer to
this question depends on the nature of innovations in intermediation services (e.g., execution
1For example, the SEC stated in 2010: “mandating the consolidation of order flow in a single venue would
create a monopoly and thereby lose the important benefits of competition among markets. The benefits of
such competition include incentives for trading centers to create new products, provide high quality trading
services that meet the needs of investors, and keep trading fees low.”
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Figure 2: Market Fragmentation
Source: Menkveld (2011)
delays). This dimension, however, is largely absent from the fragmentation literature.
Analyzing these issues is diﬃcult because it requires modeling four separate components:
(i) why and how investors value trading speed; (ii) how diﬀerences in speed aﬀect competition
among trading venues and the aﬃliation choices of investors; (iii) how trading regulations
aﬀect (i) and (ii); and (iv) how these choices aﬀect investment in speed and equilibrium
fragmentation. These requirements explain our modeling choices and the structure of our
paper, which is depicted in Figure 3.
Our first task is thus to provide explicit micro-foundations for how investors value speed
in financial markets. We consider a dynamic infinite horizon model where heterogenous
investors buy and a sell a single security. Ex-post gains from trade arise from shocks to
the marginal utility (or marginal cost) of holding the asset.2 High-marginal-utility investors
2As is well understood in the literature, these shocks can capture liquidity demand (i.e., a need for
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Figure 3: Timing and Structure of the Model
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are natural buyers, while low-marginal-utility investors are natural sellers of the asset. In
this model, speed allows investors to realize a larger fraction of the ex-post gains from trade
(Prop 1).
Our second task is to analyze the allocation of investors across trading venues. To do so
we model ex-ante heterogeneity among venues and investors. Investors diﬀer (ex-ante) by
the volatility of their private value process, i.e. by how much their marginal utility can be
expected to fluctuate once they start trading. Since gains from trade are larger for investors
with high expected volatility, these investors attach a higher value to speed. Venues diﬀer
in their trading speeds and compete in prices. We characterize the equilibrium with one
venue (monopoly), and the equilibrium with two venues and diﬀerent speeds (diﬀerentiated
duopoly). Competition leads to lower fees and higher participation by investors. Faster
venues charge a higher price and attract speed-sensitive investors. The first contribution of
our paper is to characterize the pricing decisions and equilibrium profits of trading venues
and the participation and aﬃliation choices of investors (Prop 2).
Our third task is to analyze the impact of trading regulations. In the U.S., the trade-
through rule provided by Rule 611 of Regulation NMS essentially requires that any venue
cash), financing costs, hedging demand, or any other personal use of the asset, including specific arbitrage
opportunities. See Duﬃe et al. (2007) for a discussion. The important point is that these shocks aﬀect the
private value of the asset, not its common value. Therefore they generate gains from trade. These gains
from trade are a required building block in any trading model.
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execute its trades at the National Best Bid and Oﬀer, thereby consolidating prices from a
scattered trading map. We propose a stylized analysis of this regulation by considering two
polar cases. In one case, which we refer to as “free segmentation” any venue can refuse to
execute the trades of investors from the other venue. The venues are eﬀectively segmented,
and trades occur at diﬀerent prices. The other case corresponds to “price protection”. We
find that “price protection” acts as a subsidy for the relatively slow market. At the trading
stage, investors in the slow venue enjoy being able to trade with investors from the fast venue.
Anticipating this, they are more willing to join the slow venue under “price protection” than
under “free segmentation”. An important contribution of our paper is to analyze how trading
regulations aﬀect ex-ante competition among exchanges (Prop 2 and 3).
When we endogenize the speed and the market structure, we find that price protection
encourages entry. Without price protection, when venues form prices separately, there is a
greater tendency towards consolidation, even in the absence of liquidity externalities (e.g.
Pagano (1989)). In addition we show that fragmentation leads to more investment in trad-
ing technologies and faster trading speed. Putting these various pieces together, our model
provides a consistent interpretation of the U.S. experience in recent years: after the imple-
mentation of Reg NMS, new market centers proliferated and trading speed increased rapidly
(Prop 3, 4 and 5).
Modeling entry and speed choices can fundamentally change the prediction of the model
regarding assets prices. With endogenous speed, we show that asset prices increase with
asset supply. In addition, competition among exchanges tends to lower asset prices (Prop 6
and 7).
Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of entry, speed and aﬃliation choices. As
a benchmark we characterize the eﬃcient outcome under the constraint that venues break
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even. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that, even in the absence of liquidity externalities and
fixed entry costs, a planner would choose to operate only one venue. Our model then allows
us to ask several question: When does competition increase welfare? When does investment
in trading speed increase welfare?
We find that the market outcome is generally ineﬃcient. In the monopoly case, partic-
ipation is always too low and allowing for endogenous speed always improves welfare. The
resulting speed might be higher or lower than the one chosen by the planner. In the frictional
finance literature, it is often stated that higher asset prices are socially desirable. By analyz-
ing explicitly the welfare impact of trading in secondary markets, we highlight that observed
prices are not a suﬃcient statistic for welfare. For instance, prices can be ineﬃciently high
due to limited investor participation.
In the duopoly case, both entry and speed can be ineﬃcient. On the entry side, there is
the usual trade-oﬀ between price competition and product diversity on the one hand, and
business stealing on the other. Excessive entry is possible when entry costs are relatively
high. Regarding speed choices, we find a fairly clear and intuitive condition: allowing venues
to compete on speed improves welfare if the default speed is relatively low, but decreases
welfare once the default speed reaches a certain threshold.
Regarding price protection, we find that it always has a first order negative impact on
prices, but its impact on welfare depends crucially on entry. When protection increases
entry, it has a first order positive impact on welfare. When it does not increase entry, it has
a small negative impact on welfare.
Discussion of the literature.
Theory analyses of fragmentation include Mendelson (1987), Pagano (1989), and Mad-
havan (1995). Biais (1993), Glosten (1994), Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Parlour
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and Seppi (2003) study inter market competition under diﬀerent trading rules. Other dimen-
sions of competition between exchanges have been addressed. Santos and Scheinkman (2001)
study competition in margin requirements, while Foucault and Parlour (2004) study com-
petition in listing fees. Recent empirical analyses include Amihud et al. (2003) and O’Hara
and Ye (2011). Investors’ participation and welfare has recently been study by Huang and
Wang (2010).
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) have pioneered the analysis of the eﬀect of liquidity on
asset prices. The literature of trading with search frictions was fostered by Duﬃe et al.
(2005). Diﬀerently from models in the Duﬃe et al. (2005) tradition, higher asset price is
not necessarily socially desirable. Our trading model is closest to Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009). Weill (2007) used a related framework to analyze exchanges. Vayanos and Wang
(2007) study concentration of liquidity across assets. Our model contributes to this literature
studying trading across strategic venues, thus endogenizing the trading environment. Jarrow
and Protter (2011) argue that, unlike standard arbitrageurs, high frequency traders may
exacerbate mispricing.
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Shaked and Sutton (1983)
have developed the theory of vertically diﬀerentiated oligopolies. Diﬀerently from these
papers, we endogenize the value of “quality” (trading delays) through a micro-founded trading
game. The result that, through endogenous speed, equilibrium asset prices can increase with
the supply of assets is, to the best of our knowledge, new to the literature. The economic
intuition is related to ? in the context of labor economics and directed technological change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our benchmark trading
model and we derive the value functions of investors. Section 2 analyzes competition among
trading venues with and without price protection. Section 3 analyzes trading venues’ entry
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decisions and investment in speed. Section 4 focuses on equilibrium asset prices. Section 5
characterizes the solutions to the Planner’s problem and studies the eﬃciency of the market
equilibrium. Section 6 contains a numerical analysis of the model, and Section 7 concludes.
1 Trading Model
We present our trading model in the case of one market. This section provides explicit micro-
foundations for how investors value speed in financial markets. The key result of this section
is a characterization of value functions as function of speed and investors characteristics.
1.1 Preferences and Technology
We start by describing the main building blocks of our model: investors’ preferences and
trading technology. Preferences need to incorporate heterogeneity to create gains from trade
as well as interesting participation decisions among exchanges. The trading technology must
capture the role of speed in financial markets.
Time is continuous and we fix a probability space. The model has a continuum of
heterogeneous investors, two goods and one asset. The measure of investors is normalized
to one and their preferences are quasi-linear. The numeraire good (cash) has a constant
marginal utility normalized to one, and can be freely invested at the constant rate of return
r. The asset is in fixed supply a¯, which is also the endowment of each investor. One unit of
asset pays a constant dividend equal to 1 of a perishable non-tradable good. The flow utility
that an investor derives from holding at units of the asset at time t is
u ,✏t (at) = (µ+  ✏t) at,
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where ( , ✏t) denotes the type of the investor. This type is defined by a fixed component   and
a time varying (random) component ✏t. The fixed component   2 [0,  ¯) is known at time 0
and distributed according to the cumulative distribution G. The type ✏t 2 [ 1,+1] changes
randomly over time. The times when a change can occur are distributed exponentially
with parameter  .3 Conditional on a change, ✏ is iid with mean zero and probabilities
  (+1) =   ( 1) = 12 . Finally, we restrict asset holdings to at 2 {0, 1}.
The focus of our paper is on the trading technology for the asset. For clarity, we describe
here the case where all investors trade at the same speed (later we will endogenize speed
choices and consider markets with diﬀerent speeds). The market where investors trade the
asset is characterized by the constant contact rate ⇢. Conditional on being in contact, the
market is walrasian and clears at the price pt.4 Any investor in contact with the market at
time t can trade at the price pt. Investors who are not in contact simply keep their holdings
constant.
Our assumptions about technology and preferences imply that the value function of a
class-  investor with current valuation ✏ (t) and current asset holdings a at time t is
V ,✏t (a, t) = Et
ˆ T
t
e r(s t)u ,✏s(a)ds+ e
 r(T t) (V ,✏T (aT , ⌧)  pT (aT   a))
 
(1)
where the realization of the random type at time s > t is ✏ (s) and T denotes the next
time the investor makes contact with the market. Expectations are defined over the random
3As explained in the introduction, the ✏ shocks capture time varying liquidity demand, financing costs,
hedging demand, or specific investment opportunities. For instance, an corporate investor might need to
sell its financial assets to finance a real investment. A household might do the same for the purchase of a
durable good or a house. The parameter   then simply measures the size of these shocks. If we think of
delegated management, the eﬀective shock is the sum of the shocks aﬀecting all the investors in the fund.
In this example, heterogeneity comes from the fact that diﬀerent funds cater to diﬀerent clienteles.
4It would be straightforward to add bargaining with market makers and bid-ask spreads, but this would
not bring new insights compared to Duﬃe et al. (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). For simplicity we
therefore assume competitive trading conditional on being in contact with the market.
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variables T and ✏ (s) and are conditional on the current type ✏(t) and the speed of the market
⇢.
1.2 Trading Equilibrium
We will show that the asset price remains constant during the trading game. The value
functions are thus time-independent, and equation (1) becomes simply
rV ✏(a) = u ,✏ (a) +  
X
✏0
 ✏0 [V ✏0(a)  V ✏(a)] + ⇢
⇥
V ✏(a
⇤
 ,✏)  V ✏(a)  p(a⇤ ,✏   a)
⇤
(2)
Following Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), we define the adjusted holding utility as
u¯ (a;  , ✏) ⌘ (r + ⇢) u ,✏ (a) +  E [u ,✏0 (a) | ✏]
r + ⇢+  
Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) (Lemma 1) show that u¯ is the object that investors seek to
maximize when deciding how much to trade. Note that since ✏ is i.i.d. with mean 0, we have
for any a and any ✏
E [u ,✏0 (a) | ✏] = µa
This expected utility over ✏0 does not depend on   or ✏. This implies that u¯ (a;  , ✏) =⇣
µ+  ✏ r+⇢r+⇢+ 
⌘
a.
Recall that G was the ex-ante distribution of permanent types. Let G˜ ( ) be the number
of traders of type less than   in the market. If all potential investors join the market we
simply have G˜ = G. In the generic case, however, we have G˜  G since some investors do
not participate. Indeed, we shall see that in the multiple venues model, the distribution G˜
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is typically discontinuous. We therefore present our results without putting any restriction
on the function G˜.
Lemma 1. An equilibrium with constant price p is characterized by the demand functions
a⇤ (p;  , ✏) = argmax
a
u¯ (a;  , ✏)  rp. (3)
and the market clearing condition
ˆ
 
X
✏
 ✏a
⇤ (p;  , ✏) dG˜ ( ) = a¯G˜ ( ¯) , (4)
Proof. See Proposition 1 in Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). The proposition only needs to be
adapted to take into account heterogeneity in  .
There is a clear symmetry around a¯ = 1/2 since half the investors are of trading type
✏ = +1 and half are of trading type ✏ =  1. It is therefore suﬃcient to analyze a market
where a¯  1/2. In this case, supply is short and low types always sell their entire holdings
when they contact the market. Moreover, there is a marginal type  ˆ who is indiﬀerent
between buying and not buying when ✏ = 1. This marginal type is defined by
 ˆ (p, ⇢) ⌘
✓
1 +
 
r + ⇢
◆
(rp  µ) . (5)
The demand functions are therefore a⇤ = 0 when ✏ =  1 or when   <  ˆ; and a⇤ = 1 when
✏ = +1 and      ˆ.
We can use these demand curves to rewrite the market clearing condition. All negative
trading types ✏ =  1 want to hold a = 0 and they represent is half of the traders. The
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trading types ✏ = +1 want to hold one unit if   >  ˆ and nothing if   <  ˆ. The demand for
the asset is 1/2 ⇥ (G˜ ( ¯)   G˜ ( ˆ)). The ex-ante supply of the asset (per capita) is a¯. The
market clearing condition is therefore
G˜ ( ¯)  G˜ ( ˆ)
2
= a¯G˜ ( ¯) . (6)
Notice that the asset holdings of types   <  ˆ are non-stationary since they never purchase
the asset. A type   <  ˆ sells its holding a¯ on the first contact with the market and never holds
the asset again. Over time, the assets move from the low-  types to the high-  types, and
then keep circulating among high types in response to ✏-shocks and trading opportunities. It
is easy to see that the price remains constant along the transition path. The gross supply of
assets is always ⇢a¯G˜ ( ¯). The gross demand from high types is always ⇢
⇣
G˜ ( ¯)  G˜ ( ˆ)
⌘
/2.
From (6), the market always clears.
We can now characterize the steady state distribution among types   >  ˆ. Let ↵ ,✏ (a) be
the share of class-  investors with trading type ✏ currently holding a units of asset. Consider
first a type (✏ = +1, a = 1). This type is satisfied with its current holding and does not trade
even if it contacts the market. Outflows come only from changes of ✏ from +1 to -1, which
happens with intensity  /2. There are two sources of inflows: types (✏ =  1, a = 1) who
switch to ✏ = 1, and types (✏ = +1, a = 0) who purchase one unit when they contact the
market. In steady state, outflows must equal inflows:
 
2
↵ ,+ (1) =
 
2
↵ ,  (1) + ⇢↵ ,+ (0) . (7)
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Dynamics for types (✏ =  1, a = 0) are similar:
 
2
↵ ,  (0) = ⇢↵ ,  (1) +
 
2
↵ ,+ (0) (8)
Finally for types (✏ = +1, a = 0) and (✏ =  1, a = 1) trade creates outflows so we have
⇣ 
2
+ ⇢
⌘
↵ ,+ (0) =
 
2
↵ ,  (0) (9)⇣ 
2
+ ⇢
⌘
↵ ,  (1) =
 
2
↵ ,+ (1) (10)
Finally, the shares must add up to one, therefore
X
✏=±,a=0,1
↵ ,✏ (a) = 1 (11)
We summarize our results in the following Lemma
Lemma 2. The trading equilibrium is characterized by the price p and marginal type  ˆ
defined in (5) and (6). The transition dynamics are as follows. The price remains constant
while asset holdings shift from low  -types to high  -types. Low types (  <  ˆ) sell their
initial holdings a¯ and never purchase the asset again. High types      ˆ buy when ✏ = 1 and
sell when ✏ =  1. The distribution of holdings among high  -types converges to the steady
state distribution of well-allocated assets ↵ ,+ (1) = ↵ ,  (0) = 14
2⇢+ 
 +⇢ , and mis-allocated
assets↵ ,+ (0) = ↵ ,  (1) = 14
 
 +⇢ . These allocation converge the Walrasian allocation when
⇢!1.
Proof. To see the steady state allocations, add (7) and (10) to get ↵ ,  (1) = ↵ ,+ (0). This
immediately implies ↵ ,  (0) = ↵ ,+ (1). Using (7), we obtain ↵ ,+ (1) =
⇣
1 + 2 ⇢ 
⌘
↵ ,  (1).
We can then solve for the shares of each type↵ ,+ (1) = 14
 +2⇢
 +⇢ ; and ↵ ,+ (0) =
1
4
 
 +⇢ .
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Notice also that the market clearing condition among high types is simply ↵ ,+ (1) +
↵ ,  (1) = 1/2.
1.3 Value Functions
Our goal is to analyze the provision of speed in financial markets. We therefore need to
estimate the value that investors attach to trading in each market. We do it in two steps.
We first compute the steady state value functions for investors who keep on trading. We
later compute the ex-ante values taking into account the transition dynamics.
Consider the steady state value functions for any type   >  ˆ. They solve the following
system. For the types holding the assets, we have
rV ,+ (1) = µ+   +
 
2
[V ,  (1)  V ,+ (1)] (12)
rV ,  (1) = µ    +  
2
[V ,+ (1)  V ,  (1)] + ⇢ (p+ V ,  (0)  V ,  (1)) (13)
For the types not holding the assets, we have
rV ,  (0) =
 
2
[V ,+ (0)  V ,  (0)] (14)
rV ,+ (0) =
 
2
[V ,  (0)  V ,+ (0)] + ⇢ (V ,+ (1)  V ,+ (0)  p) (15)
Define H ⌘ V ,+,1   V ,+,0 and L ⌘ V , ,1   V , ,0. Then, taking diﬀerences of the above
equations we get
rL = µ    +  
2
(H   L) + ⇢ (p  L)
rH = µ+      
2
(H   L)  ⇢ (H   p)
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Note that the asset price p is pinned down by the marginal (minimum type in each market).
For now we keep it as a (market specific) parameter. We can then solve r (H   L) =
2    (  + ⇢) (H   L) and obtain the gains from trade for type   in market ⇢:
H   L = 2 
r +   + ⇢
.
Note that these gains from trade do not depend on the equilibrium price. Hence they do not
depend on the allocation of types to the market. They only depend on the market speed ⇢
and on the individual type  . Using the gains from trade H   L, we can reconstruct the
functions L and H and finally for the initial value functions. The no-trade outside option of
any investor is
Wout =
µa¯
r
. (16)
The following proposition characterizes the ex-ante value functions, taking into account the
transition dynamics leading up to the steady state allocations.
Proposition 1. The ex-ante value W for type   of participating in a market with speed ⇢
and price p is the sum of the value of ownership and the value of trading:
W ( ,  ˆ, s) Wout = sa¯ ˆ
r
+
s
2r
max (0;     ˆ) , (17)
where eﬀective speed s defined by
s (⇢) ⌘ ⇢
r +   + ⇢
, (18)
and the marginal type  ˆ (p, ⇢), defined in (5), is increasing in p and decreasing in ⇢.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is that W is made of two parts. The value of ownership is µa¯+sa¯ ˆr . It is
independent of  . It is the value that can be achieved by all types   <  ˆ with the “sell-and-
leave” strategy. The second part s2r max (0;     ˆ) is the value of trading repeatedly, and it
depends on the type  . This part of the value function is super-modular in (s,  ).
2 Competition and Aﬃliation
In this section we analyze competition among a given set of trading venues, and the result-
ing allocation of investors across these venues. We characterize the pricing decisions and
equilibrium profits of trading venues and the aﬃliations choices of investors. Importantly,
we analyze how price protection in the trading game aﬀects these equilibrium outcomes.
In other words, we analyze how trading regulations aﬀect the ex-ante competition among
exchanges. In this section, we take the set of venues as given. In the next section we will
endogenize entry and speed.
In all cases, we start with mass one of investors, and aggregate supply a¯. G is the ex-ante
distribution of types. The participation decision of type   is described by
P : [0,  ¯]  ! {0, 1, 2} ,
where P ( ) = 0 means staying out, 1 means joining market 1, and 2 joining market 2.
Trading venues compete a la Bertrand. If an investor joins venue i, it pays a membership fee
qi and is then allowed to use the trading venue (staying out costs nothing, so formally q0 = 0
and W = Wout). Recall that we denote by G˜i (.) the distribution of types who join market
17
i, so G˜i ( ¯) is the total number of investors who join market i. This is the key equilibrium
object. Let us know formally define an equilibrium of the aﬃliation game.
Definition 1. An equilibrium of the aﬃliation game is a set of participation decisions P by
investors, and pricing decisions q by trading venues such that:
• Participation decisions are optimal: for all   and all i, P ( ) = i implies W ( ,  ˆi, s) 
qi   W ( ,  ˆj, s)  qj for all j 6= i; reciprocally when W ( ,  ˆi, s)  qi > W ( ,  ˆj, s)  qj
for all j 6= i then we must have P ( ) = i.
• Venues maximize profits: qi = argmax qiG˜i ( ¯);
• The investor market clears: Pi=0,1,2 G˜i ( ) = G ( ) for all   2 [0,  ¯];
• Subsequent asset prices and marginal types satisfy (5) and (6).
In the remaining of this section, we consider several versions of the aﬃliation game: with
one or two venues, and with or without trading regulations.
2.1 One Speed
With one speed, the marginal trading type must be indiﬀerent between joining the market
and not joining the market. So we must have W ( ˆ,  ˆ, s) Wout = q and therefore
q =
sa¯ ˆ
r
. (19)
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All types below  ˆ are indiﬀerent between joining and staying out. Let   be the mass of
investors that join, sell and leave.5 Market clearing requires
  =
✓
1
2a¯
  1
◆
(1 G ( ˆ))
This condition holds at an interior solution as long as   < G ( ˆ), or in other words as long
as
G ( ˆ)
1 G ( ˆ) >
1
2a¯
  1
In the remaining of the paper, we assume that either a¯ is close enough to 1/2 or that there
is a suﬃcient mass of low type investors to ensure the existence of interior solutions.
Total profits for the exchange are ⇡ = q (1 G ( ˆ) +  ) which we can write using market
clearing as
⇡ = q
1 G ( ˆ)
2a¯
.
Notice that if a¯ = 1/2 we get   = 0, the simplest case to analyze. When a¯ is less than 1/2,
we simply need to remember that   investors sell and become inactive. The equilibrium is
depicted in the top panel of Figure 4.
5There can also be a corner solution with full participation, characterized by the market clearing condition
G ( |min) = 1   2a¯. All investor pay the participation fee qmin, which is also the total profit of the trading
venue. Then G ( |min) sell and drop out, while the remaining 1 G ( |min) trade in the market with a supply
per capita of 1/2. The participation condition is simply Vˆ   q   µ a¯r . There is full participation as long as
q  qmin = sr a¯ |min.
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Consolidated Market (monopoly)
A consolidated market center with exogenous speed s behaves like a classic monopolist. We
index this market structure by m. Using (19), the program of the monopoly is
max
q
q
1 G ( ˆ)
2a¯
The FOC for profit maximization is6
1 G ( ˆm) = g ( ˆm)  ˆm (20)
This is a standard result. The monopoly restricts participation to maximize its profits. Note
that the choice of  ˆm is independent of the speed in the market. The fee qm increases one
to one with s.
Fragmented Markets (Bertrand duopoly)
In the fragmented case, exchanges compete in fees a la Bertrand. In equilibrium, fees and
profits are both zero. All investors participate and the distribution of investors across trading
venues is immaterial. The solution is
qBertrand = 0.
In the presence of fixed costs, this would not be an equilibrium. Without diﬀerentiation by
speed, there is a natural monopoly.
6We can check concavity of ⇡ =   (1 G ( )): ⇡0 = 1 G  g  and ⇡” =  2g   g0 < 0, 2g+  g0 > 0.
Many distribution functions, e.g. uniform, satisfy this constraint over the relevant range.
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Figure 4: Investors’ Market Aﬃliation Choice
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2.2 Segmented Venues
Formally, suppose there are two venues, 1 and 2, with speeds ⇢1 and ⇢2 and participation
fees q1 and q2. We define venue 2 as the fast market, so ⇢2 > ⇢1. A critical issue is the
segmentation of trades and the possibility of having diﬀerent prices. We consider two types
of regulations.
Definition 2. We say that there is segmentation if a venue refuses to execute trades coming
from investors of another venue. Otherwise, we say that there is price protection.7
Under free segmentation, an investor joins a market and cannot trade with an investor in
the other market. The trading venues are eﬀectively segmented and equilibrium asset prices
can be diﬀerent. Under price protection, assets prices must be the same in both venues.
Consider first the case where there is free segmentation. Prices can then be diﬀerent
in the two venues because exchange 2 can refuse to execute the trade of an investor from
exchange 1. The key issue is to understand the aﬃliation choices of investors. We proceed
by backward induction. Investors anticipate that each market will be characterized by its
speed and its price, which together define the marginal trading type  ˆ. Investors can then
estimate their value functions W defined in (17). The net value from joining market i = 1, 2
is W ( ,  ˆi, si) Wout  qi. These value functions are depicted in the middle panel of Figure
4.
Let  ˆ1 be the marginal type who is indiﬀerent between joining market 1 and staying out.
It must satisfy equation (19), therefore we have
q1 =
a¯s1 ˆ1
r
(21)
7This is our simple way to capture access and trade-through rules in SEC’s Reg. NMS
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It is useful to keep in mind that the value functions are not super modular for low types.
In addition, we know that each market must attract a mass   of types who join and sell
their assets. Because these types must be indiﬀerent between joining and staying out, we
must have W ( ˆi,  ˆi, si) Wout  qi = 0 in both markets. Otherwise, all the low types would
strictly prefer one market to another. The above condition guarantees this for market 1. For
market 2, we must also have
q2 =
a¯s2 ˆ2
r
(22)
Notice an important point here:  ˆ2 is defined as the marginal trader in market 2, i.e., the
type who would be indiﬀerent between trading repeatedly and dropping out after selling. It
is clear from Figure 4 (and we prove it below) that  ˆ2 does not in fact join market 2. Rather,
 ˆ2 joins market 1.
With two markets, we must define a new marginal type,  ˆ12, who is indiﬀerent between
joining market 1 and market 2. By definition, this type must be such that W ( ˆ12,  ˆ2, s2) 
q2 = W ( ˆ12,  ˆ1, s1)  q1. This implies s1a¯ ˆ1r + s12r ( ˆ12    ˆ1)  q1 = s2a¯ ˆ2r + s22r ( ˆ12    ˆ2)  q2,
and therefore using (21) and (22):
 ˆ12 =
r
a¯
q2   q1
s2   s1 (23)
Note that  ˆ1 <  ˆ2 <  ˆ12. The set of types who join market 2 cannot be an interval. It is
made of all the types above  ˆ12 and some types below  ˆ1. The aﬃliation is depicted in the
middle panel of Figure 4.
Market clearing in market 2 requires (1 G ( ˆ12) +  2) a¯ = 1 G( ˆ12)2 . Total profits for the
fast exchange under free segmentation are ⇡seg2 = q2 (1 G ( ˆ12) +  2) = q2 1 G( ˆ12)2a¯ . Market
clearing for the slow exchange requires (G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1) +  1) a¯ = G( ˆ12) G( ˆ1)2 . Total profits
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for the slow exchange are ⇡seg1 = q1
G( ˆ12) G( ˆ1)
2a¯ . The aﬃliation of investors to markets 1 and
2 are given by the marginal types 19 and 23. Exchanges 1 and 2 solve simultaneously
max
q1
⇡seg1 =
q1
2a¯
(G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1)) (24)
max
q2
⇡seg2 =
q2
2a¯
(1 G ( ˆ12))
Taking first order conditions from the previous system, we obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 3. Under free segmentation the allocation ( ˆseg1 ,  ˆ
seg
12 ) among trading venues solves
the following system:
1 G ( ˆ12) = g ( ˆ12)
✓
 ˆ12 +  ˆ1
s1
s2   s1
◆
, (25)
G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1) =
✓
g ( ˆ1) +
s1
s2   s1 g ( ˆ12)
◆
 ˆ1. (26)
2.3 Protected Prices
Now consider the case where is there is a single price, but two venues with diﬀerent speeds.
The asset price is p in both markets. Market 1 is still characterized by the indiﬀerence
condition (21) for the marginal type  ˆ1. However this condition does not hold for market
2, because low types can join market 1 and then sell their assets to investors in market 2.
Instead, we have the condition that the asset price is the same in both markets. From (5)
this implies the constraint
✓
1 +
 
r + ⇢1
◆
 ˆ2 =
✓
1 +
 
r + ⇢2
◆
 ˆ1 (27)
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This means that  ˆ2 <  ˆ1. The indiﬀerence condition for  ˆ12 is still W ( ˆ12,  ˆ2, s2)   q2 =
W ( ˆ12,  ˆ1, s1)  q1. We show in the Appendix that this leads to
 ˆ12 =
2r
s2   s1
⇣
q2   z
2a¯
q1
⌘
, (28)
where
z ⌘ 1  1 +
r
⇢1
1 + r⇢2
(1  2a¯) .
The structure of the value functions is still as depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 4.
There is now only one market clearing condition. As a result, the sell and drop traders join
market 1 where they can sell at a higher price because they can sell to investors in market
2. We then have  2 = 0 and the market clearing condition is
(1 G ( ˆ1) +  1) a¯ = 1 G ( ˆ1)
2
The following Lemma summarizes the protected price equilibrium
Lemma 4. Under price protection the allocation
 
 ˆprot1 ,  ˆ
prot
12
 
among trading venues solves
the following system:
1 G ( ˆ12) = g ( ˆ12)
✓
 ˆ12 + z
s1
s2   s1  ˆ1
◆
G ( ˆ12)  G ( ˆ1)
2a¯
=
✓
g ( ˆ1)
2a¯
+ z
s1
s2   s1 g ( ˆ12)
◆
 ˆ1 + 1  1
2a¯
Proof. See Appendix.
Price protection has two consequences. It increases the profits of the slower exchange,
and it decreases price competition and participation for given speeds and given exchanges.
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We can now compare the outcome of the various market structures. To derive analytical
results, we assume that the ex-ante distribution of types G is exponential
Assumption A1: G ( ) = 1  e  ⌫ We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Competition among exchanges increases participation. With or without
price protection, participation in the fast venue is higher than total participation with a
monopoly, i.e.  ˆ12 <  ˆm. Total participation is even higher since  ˆ1 <  ˆ12. Under A1 price
protection increases the profits of the slow venue and decreases total active participation, i.e.
⇡prot1   ⇡seg1 and  ˆprot1    ˆseg1 . Price protection does not aﬀect the fee q2 = ⌫2r (s2   s1), and
it has an ambiguous impact on participation in the fast venue.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the first half of the proposition is simply that price competition increases
participation. A result that is perhaps less obvious is that participation in just the fast venue
is already higher than total participation with a monopoly. The intuition for the second half
of the proposition is as follows. Price protection is a subsidy to the slow market because its
investors are allowed to sell their assets to investors in the fast market. This creates a larger
demand for the slow market. When considering its profits q1 (1 G ( ˆ1) +  1), the presence
of this demand makes it more attractive for the slow market to increase its price. This is
why  ˆprot1    ˆseg1 . Protection also soften the price elasticity of the marginal type  ˆ12, which
again is good for the slow venue. Thus profits of the slow venue increase under protection
for two reason: more demand, and less price elasticity.8
The impact on participation in the high speed market is small in practice, and positive
8We check numerically the robustness of the result ⇡prot1   ⇡seg1 to alternative assumptions about the
underlying distribution of   in Section 6.
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Table 3.1: Entry Game
Markets 1 # and 2! In Out
In (⇡|1   , ⇡|2   ) (⇡m1   , 0)
Out (0, ⇡m2   ) (0, 0)
for the parameter values that we consider, as discussed in the appendix: we typically find
 ˆprot12   ˆseg12 .
Proposition 2 plays an important role in our paper. The results regarding profits are
important to understand the impact of price protection on entry and therefore on the equi-
librium market structure. The results regarding participation are important to understand
the welfare implications of various regulations. We explore these issue in the next section.
3 Endogenous Speed and Entry
In this section we complete the description of the equilibrium market structure by analyzing
the entry decisions of trading venues, as well as their optimal investment in speed.
3.1 Price Protection and Entry
We analyze in this section the relationship between trading regulation and entry for given
speeds. There are two potential entrants, with speeds s1 and s2, with the convention that
s1 < s2. The entry cost  is the same for both exchanges. Market i’s net profit is then given
by ⇡|i   where | 2 {seg; prot} denotes trading regulations. For a given speed, asset supply
a  1/2 and regulatory framework, the profit functions ⇡ are as in Section 2. A given venue
i finds it optimal to enter whenever net profits are non negative.
We model entry as a simultaneous game. The payoﬀs of the entry game are in table
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3.1. From our previous analysis, we know the following: (i) for a given trading regulation |,
⇡|1 < ⇡
|
2 simply because 2 is faster and (ii) ⇡
seg
1 < ⇡
prot
1 from Proposition 2. Consequently,
Proposition 3. Price protection at the trading stage helps sustain entry at the initial stage.
As shown in Figure 5, price protection expands the ex-ante number of markets for
economies with intermediate entry costs (between ⇡seg1 and ⇡
prot
1 ). The expected level of
fragmentation hence depends on price regulation.
Figure 5: Entry Cost, Regulation and Equilibrium Fragmentation
The graph shows the equilibrium number of exchanges, as a function of entry costs . Price protection aﬀects
the equilibrium number of exchanges that enter the market when entry costs are between the expected profits
of the slow venue under segmentation, ⇡seg1 , and under price protection, ⇡
prot
1 . When there are two Nash
equilibriums, the outcomes are that either the fast or slow venue decides to enter, and the other venue stays
out.
Depending on parameter values, the entry game may have more than one Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies. To simplify our presentation, we assume hereafter that our economies
satisfy the inequality ⇡m1 < min
 
⇡seg2 , ⇡
prot
2
 
. Thus, only the fast exchange enters whenever
 > ⇡prot1 . We characterize the cases with multiple equilibria in the proof of Proposition 3
in the Appendix.
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3.2 Speed Choices
In this section we analyze speed choices taking the number of active markets as given. For
simplicity, we concentrate here on the case where a¯ = 1/2. In this limiting case, trading
regulation does not aﬀect markets’ profit functions and thus trading regulations become
immaterial. When convenient, we assume the following cost to derive analytical results.
Assumption A2. The cost of achieving contact rate ⇢ is given by cmax
 
⇢  ⇢; 0 , where
c > 0 is the constant marginal cost of speed beyond the default level ⇢.
Under A2, the total cost of entering and reaching the eﬀective speed s is
C (s) = cmax
⇢
(r +  )
s
1  s   ⇢; 0
 
(29)
These costs are convex in eﬀective speed s. We analyze first the case of a monopolist.
Consolidated Market
Given the monopolist speed, denoted sM , the marginal type is such that
qM =
sM
2r
 ˆM (30)
The program of the monopolist then is
max
q,s
q (1 G ( ˆ))  C (s)
We can now characterize the consolidated market equilibrium.
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Proposition 4. Monopoly. The equilibrium with consolidated markets and endogenous
speed has the following properties: (i) Participation is the same as with exogenous speed:
 ˆM =  ˆm; (ii) Eﬀective speed is given by
2rC 0 (sM) = (1 G ( ˆM))  ˆM ; (31)
and (iii) Under A1-A2 optimal eﬀective speed is given by
sM = 1  (2rc (  + r) e)1/2 ⌫ 1/2 (32)
Proof. See Appendix.
The monopolist determines market participation based on the distribution of investors’
types only. Note than in any interior solution, optimal speed does not depend on the default
speed level. Naturally, investments in speed increase with investors heterogeneity ⌫. When
the distribution of permanent types G has fatter right tails, the average investor gains from
trade increase. Interestingly, the contact rate ⇢M is concave in the frequency of preference
shocks  : it first increases with ( ) and then decreases, and has a global maximum at
  = ⌫8cer   r. On the one hand, when the frequency of preference shocks increase, investors
want to reallocate their assets more frequently, which increases demand for speed. The
marginal value of each trade decreases though since the desired holding period shrinks. Since
speed is costly, there is a maximum speed that can be supported in any market equilibrium.
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Fragmented Market
When trading is fragmented, exchanges have an incentive to diﬀerentiate their intermediation
services by oﬀering diﬀerent speeds since Bertrand competition with fixed speed drives profits
down to zero. We simplify the analysis of this case by assuming that market 1’s speed is
exogenously given (s1 =
⇢
r+ +⇢) while market 2 chooses an eﬀective speed s2 which cost is
C (s2). After market 2’s speed is chosen, there is simultaneous aﬃliation fee competition as
in section 2.
In the speed choice stage, market 2 solves
max
s2
(1 G ( ˆ12)) q2   C (s2)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Duopoly. The equilibrium with fragmented markets and endogenous speed
has the following properties:(i) Participation is determined by the marginal types  ˆ1 and  ˆ12
as in Lemma 4; (ii) Participation in the fast venue alone is higher than participation in the
monopolist case; (iii) Speed in market 2 is determined by
2rC 0 (s2) = (1 G ( ˆ12))
⇢
 ˆ12 + s1
@ ˆ1
@s2
 
; (33)
and (iv) Under A1, the duopoly chooses a higher speed than the monopoly.
Proof. See Appendix.
The incentives of exchanges to diﬀerentiate their services thus increases trading speed.
The intuition is as follows. There are two forces at play: scale and diﬀerentiation. On the
one hand, a monopolist earns higher profits and mechanically wants to invest more in speed.
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In the limit of Bertrand competition, profits are zero irrespective of speed and there is no
incentive to invest in speed. On the other hand, the incentive to diﬀerentiate pushes towards
higher speed in a duopoly. We study the welfare consequences in Section 5.
4 Asset Prices
Regulations, market structure, speed and aﬃliation choices aﬀect asset prices through the
endogenous determination of the marginal participating types and the liquidity frictions.
4.1 Volume Weighted Prices
From equation (5), we know that the equilibrium asset price is given by
pi =
µ
r
+
 ˆi
r
✓
r +  si
r +  
◆
(34)
Under price protection,  ˆprot is given by Lemma 4. Under free segmentation, there are two
prices. The asset price in venue i is as in (34), where ( ˆseg1 ,  ˆ
seg
2 ) are given by (21) and (22).
Let us define the instantaneous transaction rates ⌧i by
⌧1 =
 
4
(  + r) s1
(  + rs1)
(G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1))
⌧2 =
 
4
(  + r) s2
(  + rs2)
(1 G ( ˆ12))
where  ˆ12 is given by 23. Then we have the following Lemma
Lemma 5. Under free segmentation, The volume-weighted average price pseg (VWAP) is
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given by
pfree =
✓
⌧1
⌧1 + ⌧2
◆
pfree1 +
✓
⌧2
⌧1 + ⌧2
◆
pfree2 (35)
In what follows, when we talk about ‘the’ price in the free duopoly case, we mean the
VWAP.
4.2 Asset Supply and Asset Price
We now study the link between the supply of the asset a¯ and its price. Under A1-2, we can
use Proposition 4 to find the equilibrium price under monopoly
pM =
µ
r
+
⌫
r
1
r +  
✓
r +  
✓
1 
⇣r
a¯
ce (  + r)
⌘1/2
⌫ 1/2
◆◆
(36)
In a frictionless Walrasian market, i.e., s = 1 and  = 0 (see Section 6 for details.), the
equilibrium price under A1 pw is given by
pw =
1
r
[µ  ⌫ log (2a)] (37)
The closed-form expression (36) yields interesting insights. With a single venue, the equi-
librium asset price decreases with the frequency of the temporary shocks ( ) and with the
marginal cost of technology c, and increases with the degree of investor heterogeneity (⌫).
There is also an interesting relationship between the asset price and the asset supply (see
Figure 6), which we summarize in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Asset Supply. The Walrasian price decreases with the asset supply. For
given speed, the monopoly and free duopoly prices are independent of asset supply. With
endogenous speed, the prices increases with the asset supply.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Asset Price and Asset Supply
The graph shows the equilibrium asset price, as a function of asset supply a. The asset price is scaled by
(µ/r). “Walrasian market” corresponds to the equilibrium price in a frictionless market where entry and
speed costs are zero. “Exogenous (Endogenous) Speed” corresponds to the resulting price where there is a
single venue, and investor participation and trading speeds are exogenous (endogenous). The graph is
created under assumptions A1-2 and the following parameters:   = 10, r = 5%/252, ⌫ = exp(1), ⇢ = 5,
c = 5, µ = 1.
Proposition 6 is an immediate consequence of our previous results. In a Walrasian market,
the equilibrium price depends entirely on the marginal trading type which decreases in a.
F
The marginal type under monopoly is given by (20) and is therefore independent of a¯.
For the segmented duopoly we know from Lemma 3 that the marginal types do not depend
on a¯, and therefore neither does the price at a given speed. This explain the flat horizontal
line in Figure 6. When speed is endogenous, however, we know from Proposition 4 that the
optimal speed increases with total asset supply. This will then lead to an increasing price.
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4.3 Market Structure and Asset Price
We now compare asset prices across market structures. The link is not obvious because there
are two eﬀects. On the one hand, the monopoly restricts entry and chooses a high marginal
type, thereby increasing the equilibrium price. On the other hand, speed increases prices,
and competition increases speed. In equilibrium, however, the first eﬀect dominates, and we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Market Structure. Under A1, the asset price – with or without endoge-
nous speed – is higher under monopoly than under competition, .
Proof. See Appendix.
The message of Proposition 7 is that, independently of price protection, competition
between venues decreases the equilibrium asset price level.9 This is consistent with Amihud
et al. (2003) who provide evidence that trading consolidation increases asset prices.
5 Welfare and Eﬃcient Solution
5.1 Welfare Functions
We study the welfare gains of a given market equilibrium with respect to the no trade
benchmark:
W ⌘
X
i
ˆ
 
(W ( ,  ˆi, si) Wout)dG ( )| {z }
Partic. gains & Allocation eﬃciency
 
X
i
(+ C (si))| {z }
Entry+Speed Investment
9Note that for the comparison of the monopoly with price protection A1 is not required.
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Table 5.1: Cases of analysis
Consolidated Market Free Competition
No Speed Choice Wm WBertrand
Endogenous Speed WM Wcomp
The following Lemma characterizes the welfare functions.
Lemma 6. Social welfare in a single market equals
W = s
2r
ˆ  ¯
 ˆ
 dG ( )  C (s)  
With two trading venues, social welfare is
W = s1
2r
ˆ  ˆ12
 ˆ1
 dG ( ) +
s2
2r
ˆ  ¯
 ˆ12
 dG ( ) 
X
i=1,2
C (si)  2. (38)
Proof. See Appendix.
To simplify the exposition in this section we consider only the case a = 1/2 where price
regulation is immaterial (we denote social welfare in this case Wcomp but it is the same as
W|, | 2 {seg, prot}). We analyze the welfare consequences of price protection in Section
6. In the remaining of this section we want to compare in this section the social gains of
diﬀerent market organizations. We assume that every single venue equilibrium of the entry
game involves speed investment10. Table 5.1 summarizes the relevant cases.
10In the proof of Proposition 3 we characterize the cases in which the outcome of the entry game has a
fixed-speed monopolist
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One Speed
As a benchmark, we discuss in the context of our paper the social gains of market organization
when investments that improve trading speeds are not available. This is the case considered
in the existing literature. Welfare in the monopoly case is given by
Wm = s
2r
ˆ  
 ˆm
 dG ( )
In the fragmented case, exchanges compete in fees a la Bertrand. In equilibrium, fees and
profits are both zero. All investors participate and the distribution of investors across trading
venues is immaterial. Social welfare in this case is
WBertrand = s
2r
E ( )
For any given eﬀective speed s, welfare is higher than under monopoly. This is the classic
case for inter market competition when liquidity externalities are moderate (Economides
(1996)).
5.2 Welfare, Speed, and Competition
Does speed increase welfare?
We discuss here the welfare consequences of the advent of innovations in technologies that
permits faster trading.
Proposition 8. When trading is consolidated, social welfare is always higher with endoge-
nous speed. With fragmented markets, under A1, there exists a unique default speed s0 such
that welfare increases with endogenous speed if and only if s < s0.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 8 is as follows. First with a monopoly, we know from
Proposition 4 that speed does not aﬀect market participation. However, the monopolist has
an incentive to invest in speed to extract higher fees from investors with types   >  ˆM . Be-
cause the monopolist bears the investment costs entirely, there are not negative externalities.
Consequently, taxing technology investments is never optimal in this environment.
Under the duopoly, speed allows venues to diﬀerentiate and relax Bertrand competition.
Whether social welfare increases with technology investments depends thus on the trade-
oﬀ between investor participation levels and trading eﬃciency. When the default eﬀective
speed is low, the gains from trading eﬃciency are large and dominate the negative impact on
participation. The opposite happens when the default eﬀective speed is high. In this case,
taxing technology investments can increase welfare.
Does competition increase welfare?
In this section we endogenize entry and ask whether market competition increases welfare.
Section 3.2 shows that competition aﬀects investor participation and speed investments. In
turn, the outcome of the entry game in section 3.1 determines the number of active venues.
The net social gains of competition are given by Wcomp  WM   . Let  be the entry cost
value that makes these gains equal to zero (see Figure 7). The social benefits of higher speeds
and higher participation may in principle be oﬀset by ineﬃcient cost duplication. We can
establish the following.
Proposition 9. Under A1, consolidation increases welfare only when entry costs satisfy
 <   ⇡comp1 . Otherwise, fragmentation always (weakly) increases welfare. When the
marginal cost of technology approaches zero,  approaches ⌫2r (1  1/e)).
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is the usual one from the IO literature. The benefits of higher speeds and
higher participation are oﬀset by ineﬃcient cost duplication in economies with intermediate
entry costs. Notice from 24that the slow venue profits can be expressed as
⇡comp1 =
s1
2r
 ˆ1 (G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1))
Naturally, ⇡comp1 approaches zero when the default speed speed s is close to zero. When s
approaches one, on the other hand, diﬀerentiation becomes increasingly diﬃcult for the ex-
changes and equilibrium profits approach zero (the Bertrand outcome with  ˆ1 = 0). Positive
values of ⇡comp1 occur for intermediate s.
In the proof of Proposition 9 we show that, when the marginal cost of technology
approaches zero,  approaches ⌫2r (1  1/e)). This limiting value is intuitive. The term
(1  1/e)) represents the participation loss under the monopoly when s ! 1. The term ⌫2r
represents the ex-ante participation value of investors of types   < ⌫ that decide not to
participate under monopoly (using 17 we have W ( , ⌫, 1) Wout = ⌫2r when a = 1/2).
5.3 Constrained Eﬃciency
How would a planner organize trading in our economy? With fixed setup costs and no
marginal cost, the unconstrained solution is obviously to have one fast exchange with full
participation financed by lump-sum taxes on all agents. This, however, is not a very relevant
benchmark. Following a long tradition in public finance, we therefore solve a constrained
planner’s program where we rule out external subsidies. In other words, we require trading
venues to (at least) break even.
39
Figure 7: Competition, Entry Costs and Welfare
The graph shows the welfare gains from competition Wcomp  WM   , as a function of entry costs .
Gains are zero for entry cost . When ⇡comp1 is low relative to , competition is never socially sub-optimal.
When ⇡comp1 is high relative to , there is a range of entry costs [,⇡
comp
1 ] where consolidation is socially
preferred. This occurs for intermediate values of default speed s.
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The planner faces the same cost structure: a set-up cost  for each venue, the default
eﬀective speed s is available at no cost, and a speed s2 > s is available at cost C(s2). In
the constrained program one might expect the planner to create two trading venues. This
would allow the planner to relax the break-even constraints by charging a high price for the
fast venue, while maintaining participation in the slower, but cheaper, venue. Surprisingly,
however, we find that the planner chooses not to do so:
Proposition 10. The planner operates a single venue.
Proof. See Appendix.
The planner chooses a single venue for investors even when there are no concerns of cost
duplication (the result holds for  = 0). This result extends to the case where trading venues
can be consolidated or when the planner can choose s1. The intuition is that the marginal
dollar raised by increasing the price and lowering participation in the slow venue is always
more valuable than the direct welfare loss. The planner therefore increases  ˆ1 until it is
equal to  ˆ12.
In the remaining of this section, we therefore focus, without loss of generality, on the case
where the planner operates a single venue. Its program is simply
max
s,q
s
2r
ˆ  
 ˆ
 dG ( )  C (s) , (39)
s.t. q (1 G ( ˆ))   C (s) (40)
where the marginal type  ˆ is defined as in (30). The following proposition compares the
constrained eﬃcient solution to the market outcome.
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Proposition 11. In the constrained eﬃcient allocation, participation is always higher, but
trading speed can be higher or lower, than under monopoly.
Proof. See Appendix.
We provide in the proof of Proposition 11 an example where sM > s⇤. Intuitively, the
monopolist chooses an ineﬃciently high speed when the distribution of permanent types
has a fat right tail. In this case, the monopolist targets investors with high private gains
from trade, oﬀering a high-speed-high-price package. The planner might prefer to include
the “middle class” of investors even if that means lower speed because of the break even
constraint.
We know from Proposition 5 that the fast venue chooses a higher speed than the monopo-
list. Thus, it follows from Proposition 11 that the fast venue can also choose a sub-optimally
high speed. In the numerical analysis, we show that equilibrium participation in the duopoly
game can be ineﬃciently low or ineﬃciently high.
6 Numerical Analysis
In this section we illustrate the implications of the model numerically under A1 and A2. We
compare market outcomes to a Walrasian market, which represents a frictionless competitive
market with w = 0 and cw = 0 (which implies ⇢w = 1 and sw = 1). The Walrasian
outcomes are as follows.
Lemma 7. The Walrasian equilibrium outcomes are as follows: (i) investor participation
equals 2a, (ii) pw = 1r [µ  ⌫ log (2a)], (iii) the instantaneous transaction rate equals ⌧w = a 2 ,
(iv) Ww = a⌫r (1  log (2a)).
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Table 6.1: Baseline Parameters
  ⇢ c ⌫ a¯ µ r
608 1070 0.0002 e 0.45 1 0.05/252
Proof. See Appendix.
6.1 Parametrization
We select parameters for a numerical illustration of the implications of the model. for a
representative stock with a daily volume of 100, 000 shares and mean trade size of 1, 000
shares. Table 6.1 contains the baseline parameter values. We match trading delays to the
prevalent ones around the implementation of decimalization in US equity markets, so that the
default speed ⇢ is relatively low given current standards (average round trip trade is approx.
20 seconds). These values are consistent with the ones reported by Angel et al. (2010).
The model implied daily preference shock rate is then 608. This is a high value for most
individual investors. We think of our investors as either investment buy-side institutions or
intermediary firms representing a group of end users. We analyze a range of values of c that
generate endogenous speeds consistent with more recent standards (figures 8 and 9).
6.2 Investor Participation
As discussed in sections 5, participation with consolidated trading is always ineﬃciently
low. The equilibrium analysis also shows that participation can be ineﬃciently high in
a fragmented environment. Intuitively, when the marginal cost of technology increases,
the competition outcome increasingly resembles the fragmented equilibrium without speed
choice. We can observe in figure 8 that when c is high enough, total participation with
speed choice crosses the optimal level from below. Analogously, participation under duopoly
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is ineﬃciently low when the cost of speed is low. A similar argument can be made when
default speed is very high. In this case, the scope for markets diﬀerentiation is very limited
and total participation with speed choice approaches the maximum sustainable level 2a.
Participation is also ineﬃciently high when   and v are high.
6.3 Asset Prices
Figure 10 displays the eﬀect of parameter changes under diﬀerent market organizations.
As discussed in section 4, a first general observation is that competition in intermediation
decreases asset price levels.
Second, we find that asset prices are further depressed under price protection (i.e. pprot <
pseg). This is due to the fact that, for all possible WVAP prices, the marginal type is lower
under protection and the equilibrium price liquidity adjustment r+ r+ s is higher. An empirical
implication of our analysis is then that, fixing a given asset characteristics, its price will be
higher in consolidated trading economies (most Asian countries). Moreover, the price will
be lower in markets that enforce price protection. All else equal (i.e., for similar assets) our
model predicts that prices will be higher in Japan or China than in Europe, and in Europe
than in the US11.
A third important observation is that, in general, equilibrium asset prices bear a very
weak relationship with social welfare (compare welfare and prices in figures 8 and 10).
The comparative statics show that, as expected, @p@c < 0 and
@p
@⌫ > 0. However, while
@pseg
@  ,
@pprot
@  > 0 and
@pseg
@⇢1
, @p
prot
@⇢1
< 0, the asset price is essentially not aﬀected by the frequency
of preference shocks and default speed levels when trading is consolidated (see sections 3 and
11Japan and China are cases where there is little or no fragmentation. Trading in fragmented in Europe,
but there is not price protection like in the US.
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4).
6.4 Is price protection socially desirable?
We analyze in this case eﬀects on price protection when a < 1/2. Price protection not only
aﬀects investor participation and speed choices but, as shown in Proposition 3, it can also
aﬀect the number of equilibrium exchanges. The latter eﬀect can be dominant in economies
with “intermediate” set-up costs. When a given trading regulation | 2 {seg, prot} is set at
time I, the net social eﬀects can be computed by analyzing its eﬀect on the entry game and
the posterior speed-fee competition and aﬃliation decisions. Let
Gprot () ⌘Wnetprot () Wnetfree ()
denote the net social gains of price protection. In section 3.1 we showed that regulation may
aﬀect the equilibrium number of active venues. We have the following.
Gprot () =
8>>>><>>>>:
Wprot  Wfree if   ⇡free1
Wprot  WM    if ⇡free1 <   ⇡prot1
0 if >⇡prot1
We found that, when price protection aﬀects entry, it has a first order positive eﬀect on
Welfare. This is due to more participation and more allocation eﬃciency when the entry
outcome changes from a single to a dual venue equilibrium. However, in economies with low
entry costs, price protection does not aﬀects entry and has a small negative eﬀect on welfare.
This is due mainly to a loss in total market participation that also reduces transaction
volumes (see figure 9).
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7 Concluding Remarks
We have provided a positive and normative analysis of trading speed in financial markets.
On the positive side, our model provides an explanation for the joint evolution of trading
regulations, fragmentation, and speed. On the normative side, our model clarifies the cir-
cumstances under which competition, fragmentation and speed improve or reduce welfare.
Our approach to liquidity is distinct from the usual liquidity externality based on increasing
returns in the number of traders.
The most important caveat to our analysis is that our model ignores asymmetric informa-
tion. It is important to point out, however, that our approach is the logical first step, since
the trade-oﬀs and economic forces that we have identified would be present in any model,
with or without asymmetric information. In particular, speed-sensitive gains from trade are
required to think about investment in speed. With free entry, if the average investor does
not care about speed, then there would be no investment in speed. Nothing prevents the
formation of a relatively slow and cheap exchange. If uninformed traders choose to join
fast exchanges, it must be that they value speed. Otherwise they would all join the slow
exchange, depriving the fast exchange from liquidity. The idea that speed is provided ex-
clusively to satisfy a fraction of informed traders is therefore inconsistent with free entry.
What information would do, then, would be to change the value of speed for some investors.
It is possible that some participants might use speed to take advantage of other investors
(e.g. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010)). It is also possible that speed could allow uninformed
traders to hedge. Hence, we certainly do not claim that asymmetric information is irrele-
vant, but we do claim that the building blocks of our model are required to analyze speed,
fragmentation, and welfare with or without asymmetric information.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For steady state values we have
(r + ⇢)L = µ    +  
2
(H   L) + ⇢p
(r + ⇢)H = µ+      
2
(H   L) + ⇢p
and ⇣
r +
 
2
⌘
V ,  (0) =
 
2
V ,+ (0)⇣
r +
 
2
⌘
V ,+ (1) = µ+   +
 
2
V ,  (1)⇣
r +
 
2
⌘
V ,+ (0) =
 
2
V ,  (0) + ⇢ (H   p)⇣
r +
 
2
⌘
V ,  (1) = µ    +  
2
V ,+ (1) + ⇢ (p  L)
Let us now compute the ex-ante value functions. Let us first consider types   <  ˆ. They
join the market to sell at price p. Averaging over types ✏ = ±1, we get the ex-ante value
function Vˆ that solves the Bellman equation
rVˆ = µa¯+ ⇢
⇣
pa¯  Vˆ
⌘
=) Vˆ = µ+ ⇢p
r + ⇢
a¯
Since µ+ ⇢p = µr (r + ⇢) + ⇢
 
p  µr
 
we can rewrite
Vˆ =
µ
r
a¯+
⇢
r + ⇢
⇣
p  µ
r
⌘
a¯
From the definition of  ˆ we also now that
p  µ
r
=
1
r
r + ⇢
r + ⇢+  
 ˆ
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therefore
Vˆ =
µa¯
r
+
⇢
r + ⇢+  
a¯
r
 ˆ
since s (⇢) ⌘ ⇢r+ +⇢ , we get finally
Vˆ =
µa¯
r
+ s
a¯
r
 ˆ
the marginal type  ˆ (p, ⇢) is defined in (5), is increasing in p and decreasing in ⇢. The key
point is that Vˆ does not depend on the type  , but only on the price and speed of the market.
Let us now consider the steady state types,   >  ˆ. They also start with endowment a¯
and they are going to jump directly to their steady state value functions as soon as they can
trade
rW ,+ = a¯ (µ+  ) +
 
2
(W ,   W ,+) + ⇢ (V ,+ (1) W ,+   p (1  a¯))
rW ,  = a¯ (µ   ) +  
2
(W ,+  W , ) + ⇢ (V ,  (0) W ,  + pa¯)
and the ex-ante value is
W ( , ⇢) ⌘ W ,+ +W , 
2
Adding up the two lines, we get
(r + ⇢)W ( ) = (µ+ ⇢p) a¯+ ⇢
V ,+ (1) + V ,  (0)  p
2
Note the nice intuition
W ( , ⇢) = Vˆ +
⇢
r + ⇢
V ,+ (1) + V ,  (0)  p
2
This gives a nice continuous link between the low and high types around  ˆ. Of course, we
are going to find that the second term on the RHS is zero for   =  ˆ. Therefore we need to
compute
X ⌘ V ,+ (1) + V ,  (0) .
Note that X is the sum of the value of the eﬃcient allocation. Using the system in the
previous sections, let us define
S ⌘
X
✏,a
V ,✏ (a)
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It is easy to see that
rS = 2µ+ ⇢ (H   L) = 2
✓
µ+ ⇢
 
r +   + ⇢
◆
For X we get⇣
r +
 
2
⌘
X = µ+   +
 
2
(V ,+ (0) + V ,  (1)) = µ+   +
 
2
(S  X)
Therefore
(r +  )X = µ+   +
 
2
S
= µ+   +
 
r
✓
µ+ ⇢
 
r +   + ⇢
◆
=
µ
r
(r +  ) +
 
r
(r +  )
r + ⇢
r +   + ⇢
which we can simplify to
X =
µ
r
+
 
r
r + ⇢
r +   + ⇢
Therefore, we have, when   >  ˆ, we have
W ( , ⇢) = Vˆ +
1
2
⇢
r +   + ⇢
     ˆ
r
QED.
Proof of Lemma 4
First notice that W ( ˆ12,  ˆ2, s2)  q2 = W ( ˆ12,  ˆ1, s1)  q1 can be written as:
s2a¯ ˆ2
r
+
s2
2r
( ˆ12    ˆ2)  q2 = s1a¯ ˆ1
r
+
s1
2r
( ˆ12    ˆ1)  q1.
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Since q1 = a¯s1 ˆ1r , we get
s2 s1
2r  ˆ12 = q2  a¯s2 ˆ2r + s2 ˆ2 s1 ˆ12r . Using  ˆ2 = m ˆ1, we get s2 s12r  ˆ12 =
q2   q1
⇣
1
2a¯   s2s1m
 
1
2a¯   1
 ⌘
where m ⌘ 1+
 
r+⇢2
1+  r+⇢1
. Since s2s1m =
⇢2
⇢1
r+⇢1
r+⇢2
, we get
 ˆ12 =
2r
s2   s1
⇣
q2   z
2a¯
q1
⌘
where
z ⌘ 1  1 +
r
⇢1
1 + r⇢2
(1  2a¯) .
Note that z  1, z ⇡ 1 when a ⇡ 0.5, and z ⇡ 2a when r/⇢ is small (the realistic case). The
profits of market 1 are
⇡prot1 = q1 (G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1) +  1)
We know introduce notations to simplify the equation
↵ ⌘ 2a¯
k ⌘ s1
s2   s1
In the protected price equilibrium, firms therefore maximize
max
q1
⇡prot1 =
q1
↵
(1  ↵ + ↵G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1))
max
q2
⇡prot2 =q2 (1 G ( ˆ12))
The conditions @⇡
prot
1
@q1
= 0 and @⇡
prot
2
@q2
= 0 lead to
1 G ( ˆ12) = g ( ˆ12) ( ˆ12 + zk ˆ1)
1  ↵ + ↵G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1) = (g ( ˆ1) + ↵zkg ( ˆ12))  ˆ1
QED
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Proof of Proposition 2
Define
⌫ ( ˆ) ⌘ 1 G ( ˆ)
g ( ˆ)
Let us compare the three market structures. The monopoly allocation  ˆm is the solution to
 ˆm = ⌫ ( ˆm)
Rearranging the first order conditions, the free segmentation allocation ( ˆseg1 ,  ˆ
seg
12 ) is the
solution to
 ˆ12 = ⌫ ( ˆ12)  k ˆ1
 ˆ1
✓
g ( ˆ1)
g ( ˆ12)
+ k
◆
=
g ( ˆ1)
g ( ˆ12)
⌫ ( ˆ1)  ⌫ ( ˆ12)
The price protection allocation
 
 ˆprot1 ,  ˆ
prot
12
 
is the solution to
 ˆ12 = ⌫ ( ˆ12)  z (↵)k ˆ1
 ˆ1
✓
g ( ˆ1)
g ( ˆ12)
+ ↵z (↵)k
◆
=
g ( ˆ1)
g ( ˆ12)
⌫ ( ˆ1)  ↵⌫ ( ˆ12)
where we highlight in red the diﬀerences to help the comparison. Notice first  ˆ12 <  ˆm
irrespective of whether prices are free or protected.
Exponential Distribution
Under A1, we have G ( ) = 1  e  /⌫ and therefore ⌫ ( ˆ) = ⌫ and the system is
 ˆ12
⌫
= 1  zk  ˆ1
⌫
 ˆ1
⌫
⇣
e
 ˆ12  ˆ1
⌫ + ↵zk
⌘
= e
 ˆ12  ˆ1
⌫   ↵
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It is convenient to defined   ⌘ ( ˆ12    ˆ1) /⌫ and x ⌘  ˆ1⌫ , so that we can write the system in
(x, ):
(1 + zk) x = 1   (41)
e    ↵ =  e  + ↵zk  x (42)
Impact of protection on  ˆ1
The second equation of the system is
1  x = ↵ (1 + zk)
e  + ↵zk
This leads to a schedule x increasing in  . The issue is how it changes with ↵. We study
the function on the RHS, namely: log
⇣
↵(1+zk)
e +↵zk
⌘
= log (↵) + log (1 + zk)   log  e  + ↵zk .
Taking the derivative w.r.t. ↵
1
↵
+
kz0
1 + zk
  ↵kz
0 + kz
e  + ↵kz
=
1
↵
  1
↵ + e
 
kz
+ kz0
 
1
1 + kz
  1
e 
↵ + kz
!
since e ↵ > 1 we have
1
1+kz   1e 
↵ +kz
> 0. Similarly 1↵  1↵+ e kz > 0. So
↵(1+kz)
e +↵zk is increasing in ↵.
Therefore the equilibrium condition e    ↵ =  e  + ↵kz  x implies a schedule x increasing
in   and decreasing in ↵. The first equilibrium condition (1 + zk) x = 1   gives a schedule
x decreasing in   and decreasing in ↵. Straightforward analysis then shows that x must be
decreasing in ↵. The free price structure corresponds to ↵ = 1, while the protected price
structure corresponds to ↵ = 2a < 1. Therefore, since  ˆ1 = ⌫x,  ˆ1 must be higher under
price protection.
Impact of protection on  ˆ12
The analysis of  ˆ12 is ambiguous. It is clear that when k ! 0 we have  ˆ12 ! ⌫, which is the
monopoly solution. Define y =  ˆ12⌫ = x+ , and get the system
(1 + kz) y = 1 + kz 
1  y = kz e
    ↵
e  + ↵kz
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The first curve is y increasing in   and decreasing in ↵. The second curve can be written
gives y = 1  kz + kz↵(kz+1)e +↵kz , which shows y decreasing in  . With respect to ↵, however, it
is not clear. In the realistic case where r⇢1 is small, we have z (↵) = ↵ so
(1 + k↵) y = 1 + k↵ 
1  y = k↵ e
    ↵
e  + k↵2
We study the case where ↵ is close to one. The free price solution is
(1 + k) y¯ = 1 +  ¯k
1  y¯ = k e
 ¯   1
e ¯ + k
and we look for small deviations: ↵ = 1   ✏,   =  ¯ +  ˆ, y = y¯ + yˆ. The first equation is
simply
(1 + k) yˆ   ky¯✏ = k
⇣
 ˆ   ¯✏
⌘
(1 + k) yˆ = k ˆ+ k
 
y¯    ¯  ✏
The second one gives
1  y¯   yˆ = k
e ¯ + k
 
e ¯   1 +  ˆe ¯ +
⇣
2  e ¯
⌘
✏  e
 ¯   1
e ¯ + k
⇣
e ¯ ˆ  2k✏
⌘!
 
⇣
e ¯ + k
⌘2
yˆ = ke ¯
⇣
(1 + k)  ˆ+
⇣
2  e ¯ + k
⌘
✏
⌘
From the first schedule we get k ˆ = (1 + k) yˆ   k  y¯    ¯  ✏. The second schedule then
becomes
 
✓⇣
e ¯ + k
⌘2
+ e ¯ (1 + k)2
◆
yˆ = ke ¯
⇣
2 + k   e ¯   (1 + k)  y¯    ¯ ⌘ ✏
The evolution of y therefore depends on the sign of   = 2+ k  e ¯  (1 + k)  y¯    ¯ . From
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the equilibrium condition at ↵ = 1, we get y¯ = 1+ ¯k1+k , and the   under free prices solves 
 ¯+ k
 
e ¯ = 1 + k
 
2   ¯ 
In the special case k = 0, we get y¯ = 1 and  ¯e ¯ = 1 implies  ¯ = 0.5671 then   = 1 e ¯+ ¯ =
 0.1961 < 0. In this case yˆ increases with ✏:  12 is higher under price protection. However,
as long as k is not too small (k > 0.185), we have 2 + k   e ¯   (1 + k)  y¯    ¯  > 0 and yˆ
decreasing with ✏:  12 is lower, and participation in the fast market is higher under price
protection.
Comparing Profits
It is convenient to define a system that nests price protection and free competition as special
cases. Fist, define the scaled controls
t1 ⌘ 2r
↵s1
q1,
t2 ⌘ 2r
s1
q2.
Next the scaled profits by Fi ⌘ 2rs1⇡i. With these notations, the profit functions are
F1 (t1, t2,↵) =t1 (1  ↵ + ↵G ( ˆ12) G (t1))
F2 (t1, t2,↵) =t2 (1 G ( ˆ12))
and we have
 ˆ12 = k (t2   z (↵) t1)
 ˆ1 = t1
The general system is the one with protected prices with ↵ < 1 and z (↵) = 1  1+
r
⇢1
1+ r⇢2
(1  ↵).
The free segmentation case corresponds to ↵ = 1 and z = 1. We can always return to the
system in   using t2 =  ˆ12k + z ˆ1 and t1 =  ˆ1.
56
Let us now derive the FOCs. Using @⇡
prot
1
@t1
= 0 and @⇡
prot
2
@t2
= 0 we get
1  ↵ + ↵G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1) = t1 (↵z (↵) kg ( ˆ12) + g ( ˆ1))
1 G ( ˆ12) = t2kg ( ˆ12)
With exponential distributions we have that t2 is constant: t2 = ⌫k . Note that this implies
q2
2r
s1
= ⌫k so q2 =
⌫
2r (s2   s1). The fees of the fast venue are proportional to the diﬀerence in
eﬀective speed.
To understand the impact of price protection of profits, take the total diﬀerential
dF1
d↵
=
@F1
@t1
dt1
d↵
+
@F1
@t2
dt2
d↵
+
@F1
@↵
Optimality implies @F1@t1 = 0, and we have just seen that
dt2
d↵ = 0. Therefore
dF1
d↵ =
@F1
@↵ and
@F1
@↵
= t1
✓
 1 +G ( ˆ12) + ↵g ( ˆ12) @ ˆ12
@↵
◆
= t1 ( 1 +G ( ˆ12)  ↵g ( ˆ12) kt1z0 (↵))
Since z0 (↵) > 0, we see that @F1@↵ < 0: price protection increases the profits of the slow market.
The economic intuition is simple. The term  1+G ( ˆ12) corresponds to the “sell and leave”
investors who come to the slow venue under protection. The term with z0 corresponds to
the softer price eﬀect on the marginal type  ˆ12. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
The relationship between entry costs  and profits determines the number of active venues
in equilibrium. Let ⇡i ⌘ max
 
⇡proti , ⇡
seg
i
 
and ⇡i ⌘ min
 
⇡proti , ⇡
seg
i
 
. We analyze below the
existence of NE in pure strategies of the normal-form game shown in figure 5.
• Two-venues equilibriums. Suppose   ⇡1, By Proposition 2, we have that ⇡1 = ⇡seg1 .
It is immediate then that entry is always optimal for the slow venue when   ⇡seg1
and that, for any ⇡seg1 <   ⇡prot1 , we have ⇡seg1    < 0 and ⇡prot1      0. A duopoly
is never sustainable whenever  > ⇡prot1 .
• Single-venue equilibriums. Suppose ⇡prot1 <   ⇡m2 .
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– Case 1: ⇡m2    > ⇡m1 . The only NE has the slow venue out and the fast venue
entering, with payoﬀ ⇡m2 .
– Case 2: ⇡1    ⇡2. In this case there is a single NE where only the fast venue
enters.
– Case 3: ⇡2 <  < ⇡m1 . There are two NE where only one venue enters, either the
slow of fast one.
– Case 4: ⇡2 <   min {⇡2, ⇡m1 }. When ⇡|2 = ⇡2, there is a single NE where only
the fast venue enters. When ⇡|2 = ⇡2, there are two NE where only one venue
enters, either the slow of fast one.
• No-entry equilibrium. Whenever  > ⇡m2 the only NE has both venues out. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i) is straightforward. The interior solution FOC for speed is
  g ( ˆM) @ ˆM
@sM
q = C 0 (sM) (43)
Combining 43 with the FOC for q, and using 30 to compute the partial derivative delivers
(ii). Using A2 we have that the LHS of 31 is given by
2rC 0 (sM) =
2rc (  + r)
(1  s)2
Using A1 we have that the RHS of 31equals ⌫/e. Combining these expressions yields 32.
Using 18 in 32 we have that the optimal speed ⇢M is given by
⇢M =
(  + r)
1/2
⇣
⌫1/2   (2rce (  + r))1/2
⌘
(2rce)
1/2
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When c is suﬃciently low, it is easy to see that the value of @⇢M@  is positive (negative) for
small (large) values of   and achieves a maximum at ⌫8cer   r. We also have
@2⇢M
@ 2
=   ⌫
1/2
4 (2rce)1/2 (  + r)
3/2
which is negative for all   > 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
Parts (i) and (ii) are straightforward. To prove part (iii) we proceed in 3 steps.
Step 1: Necessary condition
Under A1 and with ↵ = 1, we have
 ˆ12 = ⌫   s1
s2   s1  ˆ1
and
q2 =
⌫
2r
(s2   s1)
The profits of the fast venue are ⇡2 = q2 (1 G ( ˆ12)) therefore
⇡2 =
⌫
2r
(s2   s1) (1 G ( ˆ12))
Note that this system is equivalent to the monopoly case when s1 = 0. The FOC for speed
is
2rC 0 (s2) = ⌫ (1 G ( ˆ12))  ⌫ (s2   s1) g ( ˆ12) @ ˆ12
@s2
(44)
The consolidated solution is 2rC 0 (s2) = ⌫e 1. With two active venues we have
@ ˆ12
@s2
=
k
s2   s1  ˆ1   k
@ ˆ1
@s2
59
Then,
2rC 0 (s2) = ⌫ (1 G ( ˆ12))  ⌫g ( ˆ12)

k ˆ1   s1@ ˆ1
@s2
 
= e 
 ˆ12
⌫
✓
⌫  

k ˆ1   s1@ ˆ1
@s2
 ◆
Using x ⌘  ˆ1⌫ ,  ⌘  ˆ12  ˆ1⌫
2rC 0 (s2) = ⌫ekx 1
✓
1  kx+ s1 @x
@s2
◆
(45)
Since C 0 is an increasing function, market 2 chooses a higher speed whenever the RHS of 45
is greater than ⌫e 1. That is,
ekx
✓
1  kx+ s1 @x
@s2
◆
  1 > 0 (46)
Step 2: Finding @x@s2
Diﬀerentiating the system 41-42 we have
(1 + k) dx+ d   k
(s2   s1)ds2 = 0 
e  + k
 
dx+ e  (x  1) d   k
(s2   s1)ds2 = 0
After appropriate substitutions we get
@x
@s2
=
k
s2   s1
 
x
 
1 + e  (1  x) 
e  (2 + k   x (1 + k)) + k
!
Re-arranging,
s1
@x
@s2
=
k2x
 
1 + e  (1  x) 
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
(47)
Step 3: Verifying inequality 46
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Substituting 47 in 46 let
S (k) ⌘ ekx
 
1  kx+ k
2x
 
1 + e  (1  x) 
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
!
  1 (48)
Re-arranging we have
S(k) = ekx
 
e  (1 + ) + k
 
1 + e 
   kxe  (1 +   kx)
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
!
  1 (49)
To satisfy the inequality we need S (k) > 0 for all k > 0 and S (0) = 0 (corresponding to
the monopolist case where s1 = 0). Let x (k) and   (k) denote the solutions to the system
41-42 for a given k   0. Since x (k) and   (k) are continuous functions, S(k) is continuous.
Using 41-42 one can see that
lim
k!1
x (k) = 0 (50)
lim
k!1
  (k) =  
where   is defined by e  +  = 2. Notice that limk!1 x (k) k = 1  . Similarly,
lim
k!0
x (k) = 1   (51)
lim
k!0
  (k) =  
where where   is defined by e   = 1. Taking limits of 48 we find
lim
k!0
S (k) = e0   1 = 0
lim
k!1
S (k) = e1     1 > 0
A suﬃcient condition for S(k) > 0 for all k > 0 is to show that the term between brackets
in 49 is greater than one. This is the case whenever
e  (1 + + k) + k + e k
⇥
(1  x) + (xk)2   x ⇤ > e  (1 + + k) + k (52)
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Note from 41 that 1  x = kx+ . Then,
(1  x) + (xk)2   x  = kx+ (1  x) + (xk)2 > 0
We conclude that S(k) > 0 for all k > 0. QED
Proof of Lemmas and Propositions of Section 4
The market clearing condition 6 depends on the marginal trading type in equation 5. Using
5 to solve for p, and using 18 we obtain 34. From Lemma 4 we know that  ˆprot1 clears the
asset market when prices are protected. The marginal type is then given by
 ˆprot =
✓
1 +
 
r + ⇢1
◆
(rp  µ)
In this case, the marginal type joins market 1 with speed ⇢1. Using 18 and re-arranging
yields (ii).
To find the VWAP price in the free segmentation case, we need the steady-state instan-
taneous transaction rate ⌧i. In the case of a single venue, this rate is given by the product
between the mass of active investors that want to trade, and the market speed ⇢i. The mass
of active investors in market 1 is given by G ( ˆseg12 ) G ( ˆseg1 ), and a fraction ↵ ,+(0) = ↵ , (1)
of them want to trade in the steady-state. Using ?? we then have
⌧1 =
 
4 (  + ⇢1)
G
⇣
 ˆfree12
⌘
 G
⇣
 ˆfree1
⌘
⇢1
Using using 18 delivers ??. The rate ⌧2 can be found analogously. In steady state both
relative transaction volumes ⌧i⌧i+⌧j and prices are constant, which explains 35.
Expression 36 is found by replacing 32 in 34 and using  ˆM = ⌫ under A1. The frictionless
competitive is derived in Lemma 6.
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Proof of Proposition 7
To prove pM > pseg, it is suﬃcient to show that pM   pseg2 . The latter requires
 ˆM
r +  sM
r +  
   ˆ2 r +  s2
r +  
(53)
r +  sM
r +  s2
   ˆ2
 ˆM
=
 ˆ2
⌫
where we used A1’s implication  ˆM = ⌫, and skipped super-indexes for notation simplicity.
Section 2 shows that  ˆ1 <  ˆ2 <  ˆ12. Using x ⌘  ˆ1⌫ ,  ⌘  ˆ12  ˆ1⌫ , we then have x+  >  ˆ2⌫ . It
is thus suﬃcient to prove that
r +  sM
r +  s2
  (x+ )   0
Using k = s1/ (s2   s1) we can define the following function
U (k) ⌘ r +  sMk
r +   (1 + k) s1
  (x (k) +  (k))
To prove 53 it is suﬃcient to show that U(k)   0 for all k   0. Note first that k ! 0 iﬀ
s1 ! 0. Then,
lim
k!0
U(k) = 1   1  +   = 0
where we used 51. By 50, we have limk!1 U(k) > 0. To show that U 0(k) is positive for all
k we need that
sM (r +  (1 + k)s1) > s1 (r +  sMk)
which holds true since sM > s1. QED
Proof of Lemma 6
The welfare formula reflects the joint welfare of four groups: exchange owners, dropout
investors, active traders in the slow market and active traders in the fast market. Transfers
from investors to exchange owners do not represent net social gains and hence are not
reflected in 38. When dropout investors join market i, their before-fees gains are independent
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of their types and equal to
W ( ,  ˆi, si) Wout = 1
r
sia¯ ˆi
The total mass of these investors equals
 
1
2a¯   1
 
(1 G ( ˆ1)), and under free competition a
mass equal to
 
1
2a¯   1
 
(1 G ( ˆseg12 )) joins the fast market. Thus, the social gains for this
group in the free and protected cases are given by
a¯
r
✓
1
2a¯
  1
◆h
(G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1)) s1 ˆfree1 + (1 G ( ˆ12)) sfree2  ˆfree12
i
(54)
a¯
r
✓
1
2a¯
  1
◆⇥
(1 G ( ˆ1)) s1 ˆprot1
⇤
(55)
Using Proposition 1, the welfare of active investors in the slow market is given by
ˆ  ˆR12
 ˆR1

s1
r
✓
a¯  1
2
◆
 ˆR1 +
s1
2r
 
 
dG ( ) (56)
The welfare of active investors in the fast market under free and protected prices are given
by
ˆ  ¯
 ˆfree12
"
sfree2
r
✓
a¯  1
2
◆
 ˆfree2 +
sfree2
2r
 
#
dG ( ) (57)
ˆ  ¯
 ˆprot12

s1
r
✓
a¯  1
2
◆
 ˆprot1 +
sprot2
2r
 
 
dG ( ) (58)
Adding up 54, 56 and 57 yields gross social welfare under free competition. Similarly, adding
up 55, 56 and 58 yields gross social welfare under price protection. Expression ?? is obtained
by subtracting speed investment costs. The single speed market equation is a particular case.
QED
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Proof of Proposition 8
Step 1: Finding net social value of speed investment. Endogenous speed choice increases
social welfare anytime that Wseg  WBertrand > 0. Under A1 we then require that
(s2   s1)
ˆ  ¯
 ˆfree12
 e
  
⌫ d    s1
ˆ  ¯
 ˆfree1
 e
  
⌫ d    2r⌫C (s2) > 0
Computing the integrals, we have
(s2   s1)
⇣
 ˆfree12 + ⌫
⌘
e
  ˆfree12
⌫   s1
⇣
 ˆfree1 + ⌫
⌘
e
  
⌫   ⌫   2r⌫C (s2) > 0
Dividing by ⌫s1 and using x ⌘  ˆ1⌫ ,  ⌘  ˆ12  ˆ1⌫ , k ⌘ s1/ (s2   s1), we can write the LHS of
the above inequality as follows
R (k) ⌘ 1
k
( + x+ 1) e ( +x)   (x+ 1) e x   1  2rC (s2) (59)
The net social value of speed investments is positive anytime that R(k) > 0.
Step 2: R0(k) < 0
Diﬀerentiating 59 we have that R0(k) < 0 iﬀ
 e   [( + x) (1 + 0 + x0) + 1] + xx0 < 0
Re-arranging
( + x) ( 0 + 1) + (1 + x0) > xx0
 
e    1 
Diﬀerentiating 41-42 we find that
x0(k) =
 x  e (1  x) + 1 
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
(60)
 0(k) =
 x  e    1 
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
(61)
Thus, x(k) and  (k) are decreasing functions. The RHS is thus negative. The sign of the
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LHS depends on the expressions ( 0 + 1) and (1 + x0). Using 60 and 61 we have
 0 + 1 =
e  (1 + + k   x) + k + x
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
> 0
and
1 + x0 =
e  (1 + k +  (1  x(1  x))) + k   x
e  (1 + ) + k (1 + e )
> 0
Thus, R0(k) < 0
Step 3. Verifying the claim
Note that the inequality is always satisfied when s1 ! 0 (k ! 0) since R(k) ! 1. When
s1 ! 1, for any solution s2 > s1 where the fast venue is active, we know from the proof of
proposition 5 that limk!1 x(k) = 0. Then,
lim
k!1
R(k) =  2  2rC (s2) < 0
Consequently, we found that limk!1R(k) < 0 and limk!0R(k) ! 1. Since R is a con-
tinuous function, by the intermediate value theorem there is a number k > 0 such that
R(k) = 0. Since R is monotonically decreasing, k is unique. The, for any s2 > s1, s1 is given
by s1 = s2k1+k . QED
Proof of Proposition 9
Using Lemma 6, the gains of competition are given by
Wcomp  WM    = s1
2r
ˆ  ˆ12
 ˆ1
 dG ( ) +
s2
2r
ˆ  
 ˆ12
 dG ( )  sM
2r
ˆ  
 ˆM
 dG ( )
  C (s2) + C (sM)  
Using A1, computing the integrals, and re-arranging, we have that the gains from competition
are equal to zero if and only if
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s1
2r
e 
 ˆ1
⌫ ( ˆ1 + ⌫) +
(s2   s1)
2r
e 
 ˆ12
⌫ ( ˆ12 + ⌫)  ⌫sM
re
= (62)
(+ C (s2)  C (sM))
which yields . Note that using 24 under A1 we have
⇡comp1 =
s1
2r
 ˆ1
⇣
e 
 ˆ1
⌫   e   ˆ12⌫
⌘
⇡comp2 =
1
2r
e 
 ˆ12
⌫ ( ˆ1s1 +  ˆ12 (s2   s1))  C(s2)
⇡M =
⌫sM
2re
  C (sM)
Re-arranging 62, and using the profit functions above, we obtain the following expression
⇡comp1    =  ⇡comp2  
⌫
 ˆ1
⇡comp1 + ⇡M  
⌫
2r
s2e
   ˆ12⌫ (63)
We from the proof of 5 that when s! 1,  ˆ1 ! 0 and  ˆ12 ! ⌫ . Thus, ⇡comp1 and ⇡comp2
converge to zero and we have from 63 that  approaches ⌫2r (1  1/e). QED
Proof of Proposition 10
In general, its objective function is
max
s2,q1,q2
s
2r
ˆ  12
 1
 dG ( ) +
s2
2r
ˆ  
 12
 dG ( )  C (s2)
and the marginal types are given by 21 and 23, so we have
q1 = s1
 1
2r
,
q2 = (s2   s1)  12
2r
+ q1.
The break-even constraint is q2 (1 G ( ˆ12))   C (s2), so the Lagrangian (scaled by 2r) is
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L = s
ˆ  
 1
 dG ( )+(s  s)
ˆ  
 12
 dG ( ) 2rC (s)+  {((s  s)  12 + s 1) (1 G ( 12))  2rC (s)}
and the FOCs for aﬃliations are
 ⇤1g ( 
⇤
1) =  ,
 ⇤12g ( 
⇤
12) =
 
1 +  
✓
1 G ( ⇤12) 
s
s  sg ( 
⇤
12)  
⇤
1
◆
.
Optimal speed satisfies
2r
@C
@⇢
(s⇤) =
1
1 +  
ˆ  
 ⇤12
 dG ( ) +
 
1 +  
(1 G ( ⇤12))  ⇤12,
and the break-even constraint is simply 2rC (s⇤) = (1 G ( 12)) ((s  s)  ⇤12 + s ⇤1). From
the first two FOCs it is immediate that  ⇤1 >  ⇤12, which is inconsistent with our assumption
that market 1 is active. We conclude that there must be a single venue.
This result can be extended to the case where the planner operates the two venues with
one budget constraint. In this case, the constraint is (G ( ˆ12) G ( ˆ1)) q1+(1 G ( ˆ12)) q2 >
C (s2) and the Lagrangian is
L = s
ˆ  
 1
 dG ( )+(s  s)
ˆ  
 12
 dG ( ) 2rC (s)+  ((1 G ( 1)) s 1 + (1 G ( 12)) (s  s)  12   2rC (s))
and the FOCs for aﬃliations are
1 G ( ⇤1) = g ( ⇤1)
1 +  
 
 ⇤1
1 G ( ⇤12) = g ( ⇤2)
1 +  
 
 ⇤12
Optimal speed satisfies the same equation as before. In this case, we see that  ⇤1 =  ⇤12,
market 1 is still inactive.
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Proof of Proposition 11
With one venue, the Lagrangian is
L = s
ˆ  
 ˆ
 dG ( )  2rC (s) +   (s ˆ (1 G ( ˆ))  2rC (s))
From the previous section, it is immediate that
1 G ( ⇤) = g ( ⇤) 1 +  
 
 ⇤1
Since the monopoly solution is 1 G( M )g( M ) =  M , it is clear that  M >  
⇤.
Regarding speed, the planner chooses
2r
@C
@⇢
(s⇤) =
1
1 +  
ˆ  
 ⇤
 dG ( ) +
 
1 +  
(1 G ( ⇤))  ⇤,
while the monopoly chooses 2r @C@s (sM) = (1 G ( M))  M . If   = 0, it is clear that s⇤ > sM ,
as expected. However, when the break-even constraint binds, the comparison is ambiguous.
We now provide a simple example to show that it is indeed possible for the monopoly to
over-invest in speed.
Counter-example
Consider a binary distribution. High  H =  ¯ with population share n. Low sigma  L = ↵ ¯
with ↵ < 1 and population share 1   n. Cost function 2rC = c2s2. The marginal price is
qi = ⇢ i. The monopoly has two choices:
• Set price to ⇢↵ ¯, get everyone to participate, then ⇡ = ⇢↵ ¯   c (s).
• Set high price ⇢ ¯, only high types participate, then ⇡ = ⇢n ¯   c (s).
The monopoly chooses high speed low participation if and only if n > ↵. The speed choice
is max (n,↵)  ¯/c.
The Planner has two main choices. If all participateW = ⇢ ¯ ((1  n)↵ + n) c (s). Then
it depends on whether the break-even constraint binds. If it does not, then the planner
chooses a higher speed than any monopoly: s⇤ =  ¯((1 n)↵+n)c . The break-even constraint
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binds if s⇤↵ ¯ < c (s⇤), which is equivalent to cs > 2↵ ¯ , (1  n)↵ + n > 2↵ , ↵ <
n (1  ↵). The planner can still choose full participation, but at limit price c (s) = s↵ ¯ ,
s = 2↵ ¯c . Then welfare is W = s ¯n (1  ↵) = 2c ( ¯)2 n↵ (1  ↵).
The other choice for the planner is that only high type participate. This is same program
as monopoly. Speed choice is n ¯/c. Welfare is 12c (n ¯)
2. The Planner chooses low speed high
participation iﬀ 2c ( ¯)
2 n↵ (1  ↵) > 12c (n ¯)2 or 4↵ (1  ↵) > n.
To summarize, for the planner to choose lower speed than monopoly, we need: (i) n > ↵
so monopoly goes for high speed low participation; (ii) 4↵ (1  ↵) > n so planner chooses
high participation; (iii) ↵ < n (1  ↵) so break-even violated; and (iv) n ¯/c > 2↵ ¯c , n > 2↵
so monopoly speed indeed higher. It is easy to see that (i) is not binding. So we have the
three following conditions
1. 4↵ (1  ↵) > n
2. ↵ < n1+n
3. n > 2↵
Take n = 1/4 then we need ↵ < 1/8 for third, second is not binding, and it is easy to find a
solution for the first. QED.
Proof of Lemma 7
In a frictionless competitive market we have maximum investor participation. Thus, the
marginal type is given by
G ( ˆw)
1 G ( ˆw) =
1
2a
  1
Using A1 we obtain  ˆw =  ⌫ log(2a), which combined with sw = 1 and 34 yields pw =
1
r [µ  ⌫ log (2a)]. With sw = 1 the instantaneous transaction rate ?? becomes
⌧w =
 
4
(1 G ( ˆw)) =  
4
⇣
e 
 ˆw
⌫
⌘
=
 a
2
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By Lemma 6, social welfare is given by
Ww = a
r
ˆ  
 ˆw
 dG ( )
=
a
r⌫
ˆ 1
 ˆw
 e 
 ˆw
⌫ d  =
a
r
⌫ (1  log (2a))
Note that when a = 1/2, Walrasian social welfare is simply given by ⌫2r . QED.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Outcomes and Technology cost
Equilibrium outcomes when asset supply a equals 0.5. In this case price regulation is immaterial. The labels are as follows.
“Consolidated” correspond to a single monopolist venue. “Two-venues” correspond to a speed-diﬀerentiated duopoly. “Planner”
correspond to the constrained-eﬃcient solution in section 5. In all cases entry costs  are zero. Parameter choices are described
in section 6.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Outcomes, Technology Cost and Price Regulation
Equilibrium outcomes when asset supply a equals 0.45. In this case price regulation matters. The labels are as follows. “Free
Competition” corresponds to the case of segmented markets, with two asset prices. “Price Protection” corresponds to the case
with a single asset price in all venues. “Free: Total” denotes total investor participation under free competition. In all cases
entry costs  are zero. Parameter choices are described in section 6.
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Figure 10: Equilibrium Asset Prices
Equilibrium asset prices when asset supply a equals 0.45. In this case price regulation matters. The labels are as follows.
“Consolidated” correspond to a single monopolist venue. “Free: VWAP” corresponds to the volume-weighted average price
under free segmentation. “Price Protection” denotes the unique asset price under price protection. “Planner” corresponds to
the equilibrium price in the constrained-eﬃcient solution in section 5. Parameter choices are described in section 6.
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